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BOOK REVIEWS
The Effect of Context on Practice
DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF
PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE. By Lynn Mather, Craig A.
McEwen & Richard J. Maiman. Oxford University Press,
2001. Pp. 244. $60.00.
SUSAN D. CARLE'
In Divorce Lawyers At Work,' Lynn Mather, Craig
McEwen and Richard Maiman offer an outstanding contri-
bution to our understanding of the effects of context on
lawyers' practice. Their project offers what so many legal
works do not-empirical investigation to test many hotly
contested questions about the realities of contemporary
lawyers' lives in the law in the United States. The authors'
study is of 163 lawyers practicing divorce law in New
Hampshire and Maine.2 Of these, five lawyers receive more
extensive examination and description throughout the
book.' While the examination of these lawyers' practice lives
is so rich with themes that it proved difficult to choose a
narrowing focus for this Review, I have chosen three spe-
t Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
1. Lynn Mather, Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Divorce Lawyers
At Work: Varieties of Professionalism in Practice (2001) [hereinafter Divorce
Lawyers at Work]).
2. Id. at vii.
3. Id. at 17.
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cific themes for closer examination that are of particular
relevance to current debates about the legal profession.
First, are lawyers zealous client advocates? Are they "client-
centered," in the terms of that phrase as used in the clinical
legal education movement?4 Second, does gender make a
difference to law practice? Do women lawyers tend to have
different practice styles? Are they more nurturing and com-
passionate? Are they motivated differently from men and do
they perceive the rewards and frustrations of their practices
differently? Third and finally, how much does context
count? Are there systematic correlations in variables such
as size of practice, nature of clientele, gender of clients,
gender of lawyers, and differences in lawyers' practice
approaches and styles? If so, what accounts for these ob-
served variations and what are their consequences? Do such
differences belie conceptions of the American bar as a uni-
tary one, in which all practitioners should be subject to the
same regulations? Mather, McEwen and Maiman's book
looks at all of these questions, and many more, with a fresh,
open perspective, sensitive to nuances and sympathetic to
their subjects, but capable of synthesis, detached observa-
tion, and critique as well.
I. ARE SMALL-TOWN DIVORCE LAWYERS CLIENT-CENTERED?
There are several genres of legal ethics literature
examining how closely allied to a client's goals and wishes a
lawyer should be. One is the traditional lawyer-as-zealous
advocate literature, which urges lawyers to engage in vigor-
ous client advocacy to the fullest extent permitted by law.5
Another is the literature developing an ethics of client-
centered lawyering, which clinical law professors have
largely generated. This literature tends to focus on lawyer-
ing for poor people and to advocate an ethics of lawyering
that focuses on working collaboratively with the client to
4. See, e.g., Robert Dinerstein, Client Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990) (defining and discussing client-centered
lawyering).
5. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L. J. 1060 (1976) (arguing for an ethics




achieve the experience with the law that the client desires.6
A third is what I will call the lawyers' discretionary
judgment literature, which William Simon' and others pio-
neered.' That literature questions whether lawyers can-
and even if they could, should-defer to their clients' judg-
ment and wishes as completely as the lawyers-as-zealous-
partisans suggests.
What Mather, McEwen and Maiman offer through their
detailed empirical research is a fascinating examination of
what one sector of the American bar, defined on grounds of
region (New England) and practice specialty (divorce law),
actually does. Are these lawyers zealous partisans for their
clients? Are they client-centered counselors? The authors'
answer is, not surprisingly but very interestingly nonethe-
less, both yes and no.
The authors use excerpts of lawyer interviews to
document how lawyers think about the degree of zealous
advocacy they owe their clients. At bottom, most lawyers in
the sample appear to regard themselves as having a duty to
protect their clients' interests, but a duty tempered by at
least three countervailing considerations. One is what the
lawyers perceive as their clients' long-term interests, as op-
posed to how clients might define their short-term interests
while in the midst of a heated and emotional divorce situa-
tion. Thus, one lawyer reports about clients who are
behaving in an overly vindictive manner:
6. Classics in the genre include Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); Lucie
E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (critically self-examining
the author's experience in representing a welfare recipient as a legal services
lawyer and attempting unsuccessfully to impose her own view of the best theory
for winning the case over her client's).
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998) (arguing that lawyers unavoidably do, and should,
impose their own discretion in judging and responding to the justice of their
clients' cases); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1083 (1988) (exploring similar theory).
8. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV.
1 (1988) (arguing for return to a historical model of corporate lawyering that
more heavily emphasizes lawyers' independence from and wise discretionary
judgment with respect to clients).
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I'll try to talk to them and get them to see it. Make them laugh at
it, make them understand that they're just trying to kill the other
party. I tell them they're paying me two dollars a minute. "You go
and have a fight, nobody can win. This is ridiculous."9
Or, on the flip side, with clients who are too despondent
and simply want to walk away:
I try to make them ... realize that they will go through a series of
emotions as the case ages and that what they're telling me at this
moment is not what they'll be feeling two months down the road. °
A second consideration balances the client's interests
against the legal practice community's norms regarding
"reasonableness." Through repeated interactions, lawyers
develop common expectations, which serve to regularize be-
havior so that lawyers can better predict and manage their
cases.1 Lawyers are advocates for their clients within this
scope of reasonableness, but resist client requests that go
beyond this realm. As the authors explain:
In sum, many attorneys who regularly practice divorce law share
common conceptions of reasonable conduct. The portrait of the
reasonable divorce lawyer shows a tough-minded advocate
committed to settlement as the best resolution in divorce (but
willing to go to trial if necessary), knowledgeable about the law
and likely legal outcomes, objective and independent in judgment,
and willing to guide the client to a fair outcome. Collegiality does
not get in the way of advancing the client's interests, but neither
does thoughtless advocacy undermine the working relationships
necessary within the community. Judgment and balance prevail in
this view of the consummate, reasonable professional."
They further explain that the reasonable lawyer
"rejects the 'hired gun' role and instead guides the client
firmly to want or at least to accept the kinds of outcomes
that are likely."'3
9. DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK, supra note 1, at 99.
10. Id. at 102.
11. Id. at 48.
12. Id. at 51.
13. Id. at 50.
EFFECT OF CONTEXT
In this respect, lawyers in this sector of practice appear
to provide a strong mediating function as much as partisan
advocacy function. The lawyers the authors interview tend
to define advocacy in ways that "incorporated fairness to
both parties., 14 They see themselves as engaged in some-
thing more akin to problem solving than adversarial nego-
tiation.15
This observation invokes the debate about an alterna-
tive vision of law practice, which famous lawyer later
turned U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis reput-
edly developed,6 under which the lawyer serves as the
"lawyer for the situation," working on a resolution fair to all
affected parties, rather than as a zealous advocate of her
clients' interests over all others. 7 Mather et al.'s findings
suggest that, in certain practice contexts at least, contem-
porary lawyers do, to a significant extent, serve this func-
tion of brokering fairness rather than fighting for the last
advantage for their clients.
These findings in turn raise questions for further
research. What are the factors necessary to allow lawyers to
operate with an eye toward the overall fairness of a situa-
tion? Two obvious factors would appear to be the relative
balance of power between lawyer and client and the
relationship between the supply and demand for legal
services. Another would appear to be the traditional expec-
tations of the lawyer's role in the setting in which the
lawyer is practicing. If we wanted to promote this vision of
lawyers' role as being to broker fairness within collectively
developed norms of reasonableness, what conditions would
have to obtain? Is the approach Mather et al. document a
historical relic of small-town, old-fashioned law practice, or
14. Id. at 114.
15. Id. at 118 (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984));
see also id. at 110 ("The right answer from the bar association stand is probably
to get as much as I can for my client, but ... what I do [is seek] a reasonable
settlement, I guess, fair to both parties.").
16. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the
Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985) (describing Brandeis's model of
serving as lawyer for the situation).
17. For a survey of and response to the literature on Brandeis's practice
approach, see Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as
People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L. J. 1445 (1996).
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could it be revived as a more dominant conception of law-
yers' appropriate role in other practice contexts as well? All
of these questions are, of course, well beyond the scope of
the authors' book, which purports only to present their
findings with respect to the one region and practice sector
they study. But the very success of the authors' approach,
stemming from its focused attention to detail and context,
suggests the need for a great deal more empirically tested,
context sensitive attention to these questions.
The authors also agree with the findings of other impor-
tant empirical scholars of divorce practice, such as Austin
Sarat and William Felstiner" and others," who have found
that the role of divorce lawyers is to dampen legal conflict
rather than engage in a full-blown adversarial process.2 0
Here again the authors' findings belie assumptions that the
presence of lawyers leads to increased adversarialness and
litigiousness. In the right conditions, lawyers may serve the
opposite ends of conciliation and resolution. Adopting a
sympathetic but detached perspective towards their clients,
lawyers invoke their authority as experts in predicting the
functioning of the legal system to reconcile their clients'
wishes and expectations with the outcomes likely to result
from the operation of the legal system.
The authors describe the sometimes heavy-handed
ways in which lawyers bring their clients to accept these
probable outcomes. One lawyer reports, for example:
It is not unusual in a particular case for me to mention ... if the
client's being particularly unreasonable... I might make a
statement to the effect, "If those are your expectations or if that's
what you want me to do, I just cannot represent you. Because
either I will not do that or I'm not going to achieve those results,
18. See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND
THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995).
19. See DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK, supra note 1, at 114 (citing RICHARD
INGLEBY, SOLICITORS AND DIVORCE (1992); Howard S. Erlanger, Elizabeth
Chambliss & Marygold S. Melli, Participation and Flexibility in Informal
Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 L. & Soc. REV. 585 (1987);
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COL. L. REV. 509 (1994); John





nobody can achieve those results". . . I threaten more often than I
do anything.2'
Another lawyer explains
A lot of [unreasonable client demands] I find [are] easy to deal
with by just delaying things, by letting things calm down.
Some readers might wonder if such practices verge on
inappropriate manipulation of clients. But the authors
reach no such explicit conclusion, instead letting their
findings and the words of their interviewees speak for
themselves. What some might see as a manipulation, oth-
ers, especially those in the practice context itself, see as an
entirely necessary process of reconciling clients' expecta-
tions with norms of reasonableness.
Mather et al. further document the way in which such
norms of reasonableness relate to professional civility. At
least in this sector of the American legal profession, the pro-
fessional etiquette many commentators have bemoaned the
passage of still prevails. Reasonable practitioners "demon-
strate honesty, integrity, and openness in their relation-
ships with other lawyers."23
To say that lawyers treat each other with professional
courtesy and respect is not, of course, to say that there are
not mechanisms at work to penalize deviations from norms
of reasonableness. The authors describe an informal process
of norms enforcement. Lawyers who do not conform to the
norm of reasonableness in the demands they make on
behalf of their clients face collegial disapproval. They are
assigned nicknames by their colleagues "that reflect a lack
21. Id. at 104; see also id. at 106 ("Client self-determination was given less
deference.., if it appeared to conflict with lawyers' public reputation among
their peers and in court. More lawyers said they would withdraw from a case in
which the client was making unreasonable and excessive demands... [based
on] the reaction the lawyer would receive from peers in the legal community.").
22. Id. at 102. Lawyers also use delay strategies to force clients to pay their
bills. See id. at 145 (quoting lawyer's report that he might postpone a final
hearing until after the client paid her legal bill).
23. Id. at 50.
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of judgment and balance," such as "'Rambo,' 'hired gun,'
'gunslinger,' 'loose cannon,' 'jerk"' and worse.
The authors sensitively document other aspects of the
underside of divorce law practice in New England as well.
They capture the conflict and guilt lawyers sometimes face
in making triage decisions2 5 about how much service to pro-
vide to whom, especially with lower-income clients.26 One
lawyer who makes his living serving low-income clients has
"developed strategies to deliver competent service at low
cost," but feels torn between "recognizing what he has
accomplished and what he cannot do given the circum-
stances of his practice."27 Lawyers spend far fewer hours on
the cases of working-class clients than those of upper-
middle-class clients.28
Most interesting in this vein is a finding that somewhat
contradicts what one might expect: The authors report that
the lawyers in their study tend to rely more on their client's
active involvement in negotiations in cases involving low-
income clients than in cases for high-income ones.29 Active
client involvement serves as a way of saving lawyer time.
For higher-income clients, lawyers are more likely to
discourage client involvement-perhaps because more sub-
stantial assets are at stake and lawyers perceive the appli-
cable law to be more complex, leading them to feel that the
application of their professional expertise is more essen-
tial."° On the other hand, as one would expect, middle- and
24. Id. at 51.
25. For an extremely thoughtful article examining the ethics and necessity
of lawyers' triage decisions with lower-income clients, see Paul R. Tremblay,
Acting "A Very Moral Type of God": Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2475 (1999).
26. Hearteningly, the authors report that virtually all of the divorce lawyers
they studied provide services to some needy clients who cannot pay full fees. Id.
at 138. Unlike pro bono services large firms provide, however, this service
occurs without formal referrals and is largely invisible to clients or the public.
Id. This finding appears particularly relevant to the contemporary debate about
the extent of, and ways to increase, pro bono services for those lacking adequate
legal representation today.
27. DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK, supra note 1, at 29.
28. Id. at 140.




upper-middle-class divorce clients are the most insistent
that they remain actively involved in the decision making
aspects of their cases, perhaps because they have stronger
expectations than do lower-income clients that they should
retain control of decisions affecting their lives."
In sum, at least in this sector of the bar where client
power is not overwhelming, lawyers appear to practice
much like Simon's discretionary ethical model suggests
they do and should.32 Lawyers are not single-minded client
advocates, but instead temper their representations with
their own understandings of reasonableness, based on their
participation in a longstanding professional community of
shared norms.
Also interesting in the authors' study is their further
findings that relative degrees of client-centeredness relate
in complex and sometimes counterintuitive ways to the
changing gender dynamics in the divorce practice contexts
the authors studied. I turn to these findings in the Section
below.
II. DOES GENDER MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN LAW PRACTICE?
One of the most interesting debates among scholars of
the legal profession that the authors investigate empirically
concerns the contentious issue of whether gender makes a
difference in law practice. Some feminist scholars suggest
that female lawyers might have or develop a different prac-
tice ethic, or different practice style, than male lawyers.33
31. Id.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 8.
33. In the words of one participant in this debate, explaining the "difference"
perspective:
Drawing on the work of the affiliational or relational feminist theorists,
like [Carol] Gilligan... and others, I speculated that women who
reasoned with ethics of care and concern, as well as justice, and who
took account of relationships and context rather than searching for
abstract principles to solve legal problems might structure the legal
system and legal practice in different ways.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the
Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
289, 312 (1989) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Theories of Gender]; see also
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
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Other feminists argue that claims that women hold or will
develop a different lawyering ethic or style from men expose
women to negative stereotyping.34 Much of this debate has
taken place on the level of theory, but there have been a
number of important empirical investigations as well,
which seem to have reached contradictory results.35 The
authors' investigation adds new data and interpretations.
In a nutshell, the authors conclude that gender does
make a statistically significant difference with respect to
certain aspects of practice styles and orientations. But the
authors find that gender makes such a difference in ways
that are not exactly what might be predicted based on the
theoretical debate alone. One such result is that in some
respects women practitioners tend to be seen as more
"Rambo like" than "old school" male practitioners. As one
woman practitioner explained:
The older lawyers... did not take divorces as their "bread and
butter" and it was never seen as a field with any prestige or any
substance or any money or anything that they would want to have
anything to do with. They did it because they had to. They are real
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (considering
implications for the legal profession of social psychology data revealing
differences in male and female styles of moral reasoning); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75 (1994) (reassessing earlier article in light of decade's
further insights).
In a similar vein, constitutional scholar Suzanna Sherry argued that women
tend to exhibit a uniquely "feminine jurisprudence," characterized by a greater
concern with connection and context, and that this different style of reasoning
can be detected in the opinions of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. See Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REV. 543, 615 (1986) (arguing that "recognition of Justice O'Connor's
unique perspective, and the unique perspective of women in general, might aid
us in ameliorating the distortions of an overly individualist liberal paradigm").
34. See, e.g., Margaret Radin, Reply: Please Be Careful With Cultural
Feminism, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1567 (1993) (discussing stereotypes associated with
femininity); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989)
(arguing against embrace of "stereotypes" about how women's personalities
differ from men's on grounds that these marginalize women).
35. Compare Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Faulty Framework: Consequences of the
Difference Model for Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 309 (1990)
(discussing empirical findings of no correlation between gender and lawyering
practice styles), with Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Women Lawyers:
Archetype and Alternatives, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 933 (1989) (finding some
differences between women and men in lawyering practice styles).
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hard to deal with because they think that I am a Rambo because I
think that there are lots of things that need to be dealt with in a
divorce.36
Or, as a long-time, male general practitioner put it,
viewing the situation from the other side of the genera-
tional divide:
[T]he new yuppie female lawyer... They [sic] put out a file for a
simple divorce case-you wind up with a file that looks [two inches
thick] ... And their demands are outrageous and unreasonable
and an abomination. They start off by sending you a statement of
how they think the case should be settled, and you hardly get
through it without throwing up. It's so unfair. ... Maybe that's a
broad statement but some of the more aggressive ones that I have
dealt with I would say they have been women. I think that they
have manifested less willingness to try to resolve this thing and to
try to work out the differences and reach a settlement .
So much for claims that women lawyers can be
predicted to be softer, less aggressive, or more conciliatory
than men!
On the other side of the gender chasm, female lawyers
who specialize in divorce tend to believe that male general
practitioners treat divorce cases with insufficient serious-
ness. One explains:
I find that, oftentimes, men attorneys are very willing to reach a
compromise that in business would be fine.... In business, with
$15 a week-give me a break. Nobody's going to fight over that.
But in a divorce situation, I think it makes a huge difference in
their lives. 8
The authors examine these findings still further to
explore the intricate relationship among gender, good-old-
boy-ism, and collegiality. One of the reasons women lawyers
are perceived-and perceive themselves-as more "Rambo
like" is their tendency to introduce more formal legal
mechanisms that protect their clients in the divorce proc-
ess. In both states the authors study, women claim to
36. DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK, supra note 1, at 23.
37.Id. at 55.
38. Id. at 55-56.
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personally introduce interrogatories into divorce practice as
part of their commitment to taking divorce proceedings
more seriously. 9 As one woman lawyer explains:
I have an obligation to the client not to accept the fact that just
because someone tells me they have a pension worth $20,000 [that
they do]. If that means interrogatories or subpoenas, then that's
what it means.... I see a lot of bad lawyering that's based on "Oh,
let's be buddies." I'm not a member of the clique.4"
In other words, according to the authors' informants,
there is currently a trend toward more formality and adver-
sarialness in divorce cases in the communities under study.
This is a trend that divorce specialists-who tend more fre-
quently to be women-introduced. In turn, the trend toward
increasing formality and adversarialness contravenes the
collegial, reasonable, problem-solving orientation, based on
consensually shared norms of a professional practice com-
munity, that traditionally typified this area of practice, as I
discussed in Part I above.
Put otherwise, the introduction of outsiders-here
women divorce specialists-appears related, in complex
ways, to the erosion of the underpinnings for professional
collegiality. A professional community of general practitio-
ners traditionally enjoyed a shared practice orientation that
provided cohesion and a common code of etiquette to com-
munity members. But the introduction of outsiders with dif-
ferent underlying normative assumptions about divorce law
challenged the harmony and comfort of traditional practi-
tioners' shared understandings. Here is a classic example of
the operation of the law of unintended consequences: Along
with a change many would value as positive-namely, the
introduction of more women attorneys-came differences in
normative orientations that appear to have led to conse-
quences many of the same observers of the legal profession
would see as negative-less trust, more adversarialness,
and less collegiality among members of the bar.
The authors further note that women lawyers are more
likely to represent women clients. This observation raises
still another set of questions. One wonders: How much of




collegiality rests on good-old-boy-ism, or not rocking the
boat? How much of the collegiality of traditional divorce
practice in New England towns rested on clients-
especially the less powerful in the process, namely,
women-not receiving all that they were legally due? Is it
harder to be collegial when one is representing the
underdog? If there is a tradeoff between professional
collegiality and fierce advocacy of those who are otherwise
likely to be disserved by the legal system, which value is
more important-loyalty to one's client or to one's peers?
Some of the authors' other findings on the question of
the influence of gender on practice are more consistent with
the traditional wisdom about how women's socialization
may affect their practice styles. The authors find, for exam-
ple, a statistically significant difference between the impor-
tance that men and women lawyers place on sensitive
listening to their clients.41 When the authors score their
interviewees along two axes of legal-craft-oriented, client-
adjustment-oriented, or a combination of the two," men are
more likely than women to be legal-craft-oriented and
women are more likely than men to express a primary or
partial orientation toward client-adjustment. 3 The authors
note the similarities between these two axes and the ethic
of care versus ethic of rights debate Carol Gilligan's work
began."
Some additional key points about the relationships
between gender and law practice also emerge from the
authors' discussion. First, the authors explain the statisti-
cally significant differences explained by gender in their
study not by reference to essentialist arguments-i.e., not
by claiming that these differences are based in women's
inherent nature or personalities45-but rather by reference
to the material realities of the practice contexts in which
women tend to be concentrated. The authors stress that two
41. Id. at 82.
42. See id. at 165 (explaining this scoring system).
43. Id. at 169.
44. Id. at 169-70 (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982)).
45. For a critique of essentialism in the context of feminist legal theory, see




factors are important and related: gender and degree of
specialization in family law.46 Newer lawyers, who are more
likely to be female, also tend to be more specialized in fam-
ily law. This correlation is the result of the changing
organization of the profession at a macro level. The differ-
ent practice styles of family law specialists in comparison to
general practitioners in turn become intertwined with per-
ceptions of gender differences.47
Another factor that accounts for the observed statistical
differences between male and female practitioners involves
some women lawyers' self-conscious creation of an alterna-
tive vision of practice. These practitioners view themselves
as a practice community
in which views of how divorce work should be carried out are
shared and distinguished from what is viewed as the traditional
(male) way of handling divorce. Not all women held this
perspective, of course, but for those who did, there was a clear
sense that they were doing something different, trying to carve out
a niche for themselves in providing a new and distinct kind of
professional service in divorce. And this shared perspective helped
to establish and sustain a community of practice among women
divorce attorneys that reinforced that view.'
In other words, the creation of a distinct community of
practice and the holding of alternative practice norms rein-
force each other in a two-way feedback loop.
Another factor the authors note, drawing from David
Wilkins's important work on the ethical self-perceptions of
black attorneys,49 involved client expectations. Just as
Wilkins notes that black lawyers cannot escape the fact
that their clients and other lawyers always see them as
black, "[c]lients of female lawyers may expect them to listen
more to their troubles and to be more nurturing."'
46. DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK, supra note 1, at 14.
47. Id. at 55.
48. Id. at 82.
49. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and
Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Two
Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of
Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (1993).
50. DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK, supra note 1, at 83.
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EFFECT OF CONTEXT
In sum, the authors' main message with respect to their
empirical investigation of the difference gender makes in
practice approaches is that this factor has everything to do
with context, in complex and subtle ways. Gender matters,
but not necessarily in the ways we might predict. Instead,
careful attention is required to the situation presented in
localized practice communities with particular historical
traditions, socially received normative orientations, and
economic and demographic forces at work. Generalization is
no substitute for empirical investigation.
III. CONTEXT IN SHAPING LAWYERS' ETHICAL ORIENTATIONS
The final theme in the authors' work I will explore here
concerns the debate about the role of context in the shaping
of lawyers' ethical orientations to practice. If it persuades
on no other count, the Mather et al. study stands as a com-
pelling work promoting a shift in orientation away from
prescribing or focusing on universal practice norms and
toward a more complex, subtle, and context-specific under-
standing of how lawyers' ethics are formed and imple-
mented. The authors show how, in their terminology, it is in
multiple communities of practice-defined on the basis of
client bases, geographical location, gender, economics,
broad demographics, and degrees of specialization-that
lawyers create, transmit and enforce their ethical self-
conceptions."' It is therefore in local practice communities,
the authors suggest, that collegial control is strongest. 2 Ef-
forts to improve the ethical regulation of lawyers' conduct
should focus on the informal mechanisms that operate in
localized practice contexts, rather than continuing in the
one-size-fits-all model that has traditionally typified legal
ethics regulation efforts.53 This is a point many leading
ethics scholars have been making for some time now.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2004) (ABA publication
suggesting rules for legal ethics regulation to be adopted by state supreme
courts and applied to all lawyers practicing in the jurisdiction).
54. An eloquent example of this literature is Robert W. Gordon, A New Role
For Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185
(2003) (arguing for the separation of corporate lawyers' ethical responsibilities
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What Mather et al. do in their important book is provide
empirical fodder for the advocates of context-specific ethics
regulation. They succeed superbly in advancing this cause.
in the context of corporate counseling as opposed to adversarial litigation and
proposing new ethical standards for corporate counseling). Two classics that in
many ways triggered the outpouring of calls for context-sensitive regulation
include David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
799 (1992) and David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers
After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993). Note that all of these
articles appeared in the wake of massive corporate scandals blamed in
significant part on the lack of adequately tailored ethical standards for lawyers
representing powerful corporate clients in the context of regulatory compliance
counseling.
1362 [Vol. 52
